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EXPLANATORY PRIORITY AND
THE "COUNTERFACTUALS OF FREEDOM"
Wes Morriston

On a Molinist account of creation and providence, not only is there is a COffiplete set of truths about what every possible person would freely do in any
possible set of circumstances, but these conditional truths are part of the very
explanation of our existence. Robert Adams has recently argued that the
explanatory priority of these conditionals undermines libertarian freedom. In
the present essay, I take at close look at Adams' argument and at the Molinist
response of Thomas Flint. After showing that Flint's response is inadequate, I
develop what I believe to be a more successful Molinist response to Adams'
argument. Along the way, I seek to provide some insight into the nature of
libertarian freedom and the proper interpretation of the much discussed
"principle of alternate possibilities."

Is it the case that for each possible person there is a complete set of true
conditionals about what that person would do in any possible situation in
which that person exists and is free? The existence of such truths - comll1only, if somewl1at inaccuratelyl, referred to 110wadays as the "counterfactuals of freedom" - was the subject of heated debate in the sixteenth century. The Jesuit theologian, Luis de Molina, and his followers held that they
were needed for an adequate account of providence and free will. The
Molinists referred to God's knowledge of such conditionals as "middle
knowledge," since it lies ll1idway between his "free knowledge" of those
contingent truths that depend entirely on his own free choices, and his
"natural knowledge" of necessary truths that are independent of his will.
Although the counterfactuals of freedom are contingent, they are like necessary truths in that they are cOll1pletely independent of God's will, and
God has no control over thell1.
According to Molinism, the counterfactuals of freedom are a bedrock
feature of reality, and they playa crucial role in the explanation of the existence of human persons. God created us and made us free, we are to suppose, having taken fully into account his "middle knowledge" of what we
would do with our freedom. Had God been better pleased with what
some other possible set of free creatures would have done with their freedom, he would have created them instead. Had he been better pleased
Wit11 what we would have done with our freedom in SOll1e other possible
situation, he would have created us in that situation instead.
A great advantage of Molinism is that it allows those who hold it to
combine a full-blooded belief ll1libertarian freedom with the view that all
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human choices and actions take place in accordance with a detailed divine
plan. In the Molinist world, there is no such thing as brute chance, and
Providence rules alle It rules - not by compelling obedience, but by taking
into account what it knows about what every possible person would freely
do in any possible set of circumstances.

But are they really counterfactuals offreedom?
To a number of philosophers, it has seemed that this entire picture is
logically incoherent - that the truths about the behavior of possible persons
under various possible circumstances could not be genuine counterfactuals
of freedom. For surely, if I an1 free to refrain from doing an act, then it must
not be the case that my so refraining has already been precluded by a set of
conditions that are part of the reason why lexist. But that is exactly how it
would be if the Molinist explanatiol1 were true. God created us at least
partly because he knew that we would make these choices and not others.
It is difficult to get the argument just right, however, and Molinists have
shown considerable ingenuity in dodging the bullet. In Divine Providence:
The Molinist Account/ Thomas Flint devotes an entire chapter to Hasker's
version of the objection3, and another to that of Robert Adams4 • Much can
be learned from a consideration of these arguments. In the present essay, I
shall take a close look at Adams' version of the objection and at Flint's
reply. I shall try to show that Flint's response is not completely successful,
but I shall then try to develop a more adequate Molinist response to the
objection. Along the way, I hope to provide some insight into the nature of
libertarian freedom and the proper interpretation of the much discussed
"principle of alternate possibilities."

Adams vs. Flint
Adams begins by trying to show that Molinism entails that the truth of
one's counterfactuals of freedon1 is "explanatorily prior" to all one's choices and actions. He summarizes this part of the argument as follows.
(1)

According to Molinism, the truth of all true counterfactuals of
freedom about us is explal1atorily prior to God's decision to
create uso

(2)

God's decision to create us is explanatorily prior to our existence.

(3)

Our existence is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and
actions.

(4)

The relation of explanatory priority is transitive.

(5)

Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 1-4) that the trLlth of all
true counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior
to all of OLlr choices and actions. 5
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Adams then claims that
(SI) If I freely do A in C, no truth that is strictly inconsistent with
my refraining from A in C is explanatorily prior to my choosing
and acting as I do in C.6
Given (5) and (SI), Adan1s thinks it follows that, for any act A and conditions C, I do not freely do A in C. For suppose that I do A in C.
According to Molinism, there is a true counterfactual of freedom (one
taken fully into account by God when he decided what and whom to create) saying that if I were in C I would do A. This counterfactual is therefore explanatorily prior to my doing A in C (from 5 above). It is also strictly inconsistent with my refraining from doing A in C. So (by SI) it follows
that I do not do A freely in C.
Evidently, the key notion 11ere is that of "explanatory priority." Adams
does not offer an analysis of this concept, as he thinks he is merely taking
over the Molinist's notion of explanatory priority. This leaves an opening
for the Molinist, one that Flint is quick to exploit. The main thrust of Flint's
response to Adams can be summarized as follows.
The kind of "explanatory priority" tl1at is at issue isn't "explanatory priority in general," but rather "a specific kind of explanatory priority" - viz.,
"something's being explanatorily prior to someone's choosing and
acting."7 The most natural ways of understanding the kind of priority 8
involved in Molinism, Flint thinks, are these:

=

(A)

x is explanatorily prior to my choices and actions x is true,
and there is no choice or action within my power that would
cause it to be the case that x is false.

(B)

x is explanatorily prior to my choices and actions x is true,
and there is no choice or action within my power such that,
were I so to choose or so to act, x would be false.

=

Flint first argues that (A) is of no use to Adams, on the ground that no
one who is "orthodox" with respect to God's complete and infallible foreknowledge should accept (SI) when explanatory priority is interpreted in
line with (A). Flint thinks that no one has causal power over the past.
Consequently, no one has the power to cause God's past knowledge to be
other than it was. It follows that even straight divine foreknowledge (without middle knowledge) is explanatorily prior to one's choices and actions
in the sense defined by (A). If, therefore, (SI) were accepted, an Adan1sstyle argument would quickly show that divine foreknowledge (with or
without middle knowledge) is incompatible with human freedom. 9
Flint thinks (B) is no better from Adams' point of view, since it casts
doubt on premise (4) of Adams' argument. When explanatory priority is
interpreted in accordance with (B), Flint thinks there is 110 reason why a
Molinist should grant that it is a transitive relation. To see why, let T stand
for the true counterfactuals of freedom, D for God's decision about what to
create in light of T, and A for some action perforn1ed by one of God's
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human creatures. Then, Flint thinks, the claim that the counterfactuals of
freedom are explanatorily prior to God's decision amounts to thjs.
(i)

(D~T)

&

(~D~T)

[Where

~

is the arrow of counterfactual

implication.]
The claim that God's decision is explanatorily prior to the doing of A
amounts to this.
(ii)

(A~D)

&

(~A~D)

And the claim that the counterfactuals of freedom are explanatorily prior to
the action in question amounts to this.
(iii)

(A~T)

&

(~A~T)

If explanatory priority were transitive, Flint says that we would be able
to derive (iii) from (i) and (ii). But Flint tl1.inks we cannot do this. Since
cOllnterfactual implication is not in general transitive, neither conjunct of
(iii) follows from (i) and (ii). This does not matter in the case of the lefthand conjunct, since (A~T) is obviously true. But Flint thinks we are left
without any reason to believe the right-hand conjunct of (iii).
Let me try to put all of this a bit more intuitively. Interpreted in accordance with (B), the heart of Adams' argument goes like this:
(BI) There is nothing God can do such that, were he to do it, any of
the counterfactuals of freedom would be false. (In this sense,
they are explanatorily prior to any decision God might make.)
(B2) There is nothing we can do such that, were we to do it, God
would not have acted as he did in creation. (In this sense,
God's creative act is explanatorily prior to our choices and
actions.)
Since Adams thinks that explanatory priority is a transitive relation, he
thinks it follows that:
(B3) There is nothing we can do such that were we to do it, any of
the counterfactuals of freedom would be false. (In tl1.is sense,
the cOLl11.terfactuals of freedom are explanatorily prior to our
choices and actions.)
A MoliI1.ist must deny (B3). For consider. If I freely do A in C, then (say
the Molinists) the counterfactual of freedoll1., C~A must have been true of
me. If I had not done A in C, C~~A would have been true of me instead.
Since I did A freely, I must have been free not to do A - in which case, I
must have been free to do something such that, had I done it, C~~A, and
not C~A, would have been true of me. It follows that I am free to do
something sucl1. tl1.at the counterfactual of freedom that is in fact true of me
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(C~A) would instead have been false. This does not mean that I can cause
it to have been false, but it does mean that I have what Flint calls "counterfactual power" over my counterfactuals of freedom.
So where does Adams's argument go wrong? On Molinism (BI) is true.
What about (B2)? A Molinist might deny (B2), arguing that we have "counterfactual power" over (some of) God's creative decisions. But there is
another option. Since the inference from (BI) and (B2) to (B3) is not formally valid, the Molinist does not have to deny (B2). He can instead claim that
explanatory priority is not, on the account offered by (B), a transitive relation, in which case (B3) is not entailed by (BI) and (B2). This, as we have
seen, is the line that Flint takes.

Explanatory priority

We seem to have arrived at an impasse. The anti-Molinist says that
(B)-type explanatory priority is a transitive relation and that (BI) and (B2)
entail (B3). The Molinist replies that - on Molinism - (BI) and (B2) do not
entail (B3), because (B)-type explanatory priority is not a transitive relation.
But before letting it go at that, let's take another look at the concept of
explanatory priority. Do either of Flint's formulations succeed in capturing
this key notion?
I think the answer to this question is no. Whatever explanatory priority
is, it must surely have something to do with explanation. A true proposition P is not explanatorily prior to a true proposition Q unless P is in some
way involved in the explanation of Q - involved, that is, in the answer to
the question, "Why is it that Q?" None of Flint's formulations satisfy this
sin1ple requirement. Suppose, for example, that it is a fact (unbeknownst
to us) that:
(P)

There are exactly ten boulders on the moon nearest to Jupiter,
each of which weighs exactly 1.333 tons.

Plainly, we have neither causal nor counterfactual power over (P).
There is nothing we can do that will cause (P) to have been false, and nothing we can do or decide such that were we to do or decide it (P) would
have been false. So on either of Flint's analyses, (P) is "explanatorily prior"
to our choices and actions. But it would be quite a stretch to insist that (P)
is in any way involved in the explanation of our choices and actions.
Flint's mistake occurs right at the beginning of his discussion, when he
writes:
Note first of all that the concept that is needed for Adams' argument
isn't explanatory priority in gel1eral, but a specific kind of explanatory priority- something's being explanatorily prior to someone's
choosing and acting. It is this kind of explanatory priority, I think,
that we need most to examine. 10
Adams' argument does indeed turn on the claim that the counterfactuals of freedom are "explanatorily prior" to "someone's choosing and act-
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ing." But I see no reason to distinguish a different sense of explanatory priority for each different explanandum. The relation of explanatory priority
may be the same for many different explananda.
Flint offers the following defense of his approach.
And I say this not only because it is the kind of explanatory priority
that is employed in Adams' argument, and thus the only kind of
explanatory priority that Adams really needs, but also because it is
the principal kind of priority that the Molinist needs to discriminate
between middle knowledge and free knowledge. In saying that middIe knowledge is distinct from and prior to free knowledge, the
Molinist means to say that the former is independent of God's will,
while the latter is not. For any element of his free knowledge, there
were actions within God's power which would have led to that
proposition's being false. No element of his middle knowledge is
thus dependent upon his action; what he knows by middle knowledge are facts about which he can do nothing. ll
It is certainly true that Molinists think that the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom is fixed independently of God's will. But that makes them
explanatorily prior only because his knowledge of those truths is part of the
explanation of his decision about what to create. The counterfactuals of
freedom are explanatorily prior to God's creative will because they are a
critical element in the story that explains why God chose to (weakly) actualize this world rather than any other possible one.
In the following passage, Flint acknowledges that the priority we are
interested in here is priority in the order ofexplanation.
Explanatory priority for Adams, then, is supposed to be priority in
the order of explanation, and priority in this sense has to do with
what is and isn't "data that God takes into account"-that is, with
facts of which he is aware but over which he has no control. 12
This is exactly right. Nevertheless, Flint seeks to refute Adams' argument
by considering aseries of accounts of "explanatory priority" that h.ave
nothing directly to do with the order of explanation. It is hardly surprising
that none of them serves the needs of Adams' argument.
I do not have an especially deep or illuminating analysis of explanatory
priority to offer. Nevertheless, I think we can make some progress in getting
the issue properly focussed. As astart, we might try something like this.
(EP) P is explanatorily prior to Q == Q is not self-explanatory; and P is
part of the explanation of Q.
This is obviously correct, as far as it goes. Unless a thing is self-explanatory (as God is sometimes supposed to be), the explanans explains the
explanandum, and not the other way around. In that sense, it is "prior" to
the explanandum. But what is an explanation? Which of the various senses
of the word "explanation." do we have in mind here?

EXPLANATORY PRIORITY AND COUNTERFACTUALS

27

Suppose we are interested in finding the explanation of an event E.
Then what we want to find, I suggest, is a set of conditions, cI ..cn .., such
that (i) cI ..cn .. are not simply a redescription of E; and such that (ii) cI ..cn ..
answer the question, "Why did E occur?" The conditions cI ..cn .. of a good
explanation need not be causally sufficient for the occurrence of E. But it
must at least be the case that they influenced the occurrence of E, making it
more probable - all other things being equal- that E would occur. 13
For example, an explanation of a high tide will provide a causally sufficient explanation. The moon, the water, and the rest of the earth, and their
positions relative to one another, as well as the inverse square law of attrac!ion - all will play their parts in the explanation. Given these conditions, the
tide must be high. In contrast to this, an explanation of the disintegration of
a uranium atom at a particular time will not be causally sufficient for its
explanandum. The elements of the explanation will include the internal state
of the atom prior to its disintegration, as well as statistical laws about the
frequency with which atoms in that state behave in certain ways. Similarly,
a satisfactory explanation of a murder need not delineate causally sufficient
conditions. But it will say what influenced the murderer's behavior.
In all such cases, the elements of the explanation are distinct from the
event explained. They are also "prior" to the event in th.e sense that, however indeterministically, it flows from them, and not the other way around.
Given this (admittedly rough) understanding of explanation and explanatory priority, the main premise of Adams' argument - (SI) - is quite plausible. If I do an act A and my refraining from doing A is strictly inconsistent
with some part of the explanation of my doing A, then surely I cannot be
free to refrain from doing it. To put it differently - if the explanation of an
act is so good that it logically entails that I do A, then no libertarian should
thil1.k I am free to refrain from doing A.
So far, so good. But is explanatory priority in the sense of (EP) a transitive relation? It is not at all clear that it iso Suppose a long and tender kiss
was a key factor in getting may parents into bed the day I was conceived.
Then perhaps that kiss is part of the explanation of my existence. Let us
suppose (at least for the sake of argument) that my existence is part of the
explanation of my writing this paper. Does it follow that my parents' kiss
is part of the explanation of my writing this paper? Surely that would be a
bit of a stretch?
However, some philosophers may think my parents' kiss is part of the
total explanation of my writill.g this paper, where a total explanation
includes everything that contributes - however indirectly - to the explanation of my act. If such a concept is defensible, then perhaps (EP) could be
replaced by the following principle:
(EP*) P is explanatorily prior to Q == Q is not self-explanatory; and P is
part of the total explanation of Q.
Gr perhaps better:
(EP**) P is explanatorily prior to Q == Q is not self-explanatory; and
either (i) P contributes directly to the explanation of Q, or (ii) P
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contributes directly to something that does contribute directly
to the explanation of [...] Q.
So ul1.derstood, explanatory priority is clearly a transitive relation; in
which case (1) - (5) of Adams' argument is impeccable. Clearly, the counterfactuals of freedom are part of the total explanation of our existence, and
our existence is part of the total explanation of our choices and actions. So
the cOLmterfactuals of freedom must be part of the total explanation of our
choices and actions.
Hut now we have to ask whether, on this revised account of explanatory
priority, (SI) is true. Is it the case that if refraining from doing an act A is
strictly inconsistent with something that directly or indirectly contributes
to the total explanation of my decision, then I am not free to refrain from
doing A? If we can justify an affirmative answer, then Adams' argument
will have succeeded in refuting Molinism.

Recasting the issue
So what about (SI)? Can we choose and act in ways that are incompatible
with truths that are "explanatorily prior" (in the sense just defined) to our
decisions and our actions? Is it within our power to perform actions such
that were we to perform them those truths would not have been true? Do
we, to borrow Flint's expression, have "counterfactual power" over then1.?
In trying to answer this question, I think it may be helpful to recast the
issue in the following way. Anyone - Molinist or not - would presumably
agree that one's freedom is confined within limits imposed by the situation
in which one finds oneself. If I had a different kind of body, I might have
been able to run a marathon. Hut I don't, and I can't. If I had had a different sort of mind, I might have been able to win the Nobel Prize for chemistry. Hut I don't, and I can't. If I had the right friends, I might have been
able to visit the private section of the White House. Hut I don't, and (as
things are now) I can't. More generally, if my situation had been different,
the range of my possibilities might have been different. Hut my situation is
as it is, and my possibilities are as they are, and it would be absurd to say
that I have "coul1.terfactual power" over those aspects of my situation
which genuinely limit my possibilities.
One obvious way to conceptualize this is to say that there is a set of conditions, C , such that it is not within my power to perform actions that are
inconsistent with those conditions. The scope of what I do have the power
to do - of my "possibilities," so to speak - is defined relative to C. To say
that it is within one's power to do or refrain from doing something is to say
that one's doing so is not logically incompatible with (not "strictly inconsistent with") C .
Hut what is the relevant set of conditions? Uncontroversial examples
would be the laws of nature, the physical environment in which I find
myself, the kind of mind and body I have, and a whole range of more particular facts about me - where I was born and grew up, the people I know,
the experiences I have had. All of these contribute to making some things
possible for me, and others impossible. These are clear examples of condi-
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tions over which I do not have "counterfactual power."
Other examples are more controversial. Will there be a seafight tomorrow? Suppose it is - now - a fact that there will be. Does that fact belong
to the set of conditions that lin1it the possibilities of the admiral of the fleet?
Is a seafight therefore unavoidable? A few philosophers have thought that
the only alternative to logical fatalism is to say that there are truth value
gaps with regard to future contingents. But most philosophers who think
about these matters disagree. They see no problem in asserting both that
one will in fact do son1ething and that it is within one's power to refrain
from doing so. For them, these "facts" about future free actions do not
belong to the freedom-limiting set of conditions, C .
But what, exactly, are the boundaries of C? This is wl1ere all the important disagreements lie. Libertarians would agree that causes and causallaws
go in. But what about the past? Does the relevant set of conditions include
all of the past? Or only some of it? Are tl1ere "soft facts" about the past that
make no difference to what we can do? "Facts" over which we do have
"counterfactual power?" If so, is God's foreknowledge a "soft" fact? Or
does it properly belong to the set of facts that limit the range of our freedom?
The present issue, of course, does not concern simple foreknowledge,
but rather God's middle knowledge of what every possible person would
do if created free in any possible situation. Do the true counterfactuals of
freedom properly belong to the set of conditions that limits our freedom?
Adams' argument can be viewed as an attempt to defend an affirmative
answer to this question. I read Adams as saying something like this. "Not
only are the objects of God's middle knowledge fixed independently of our
existence, but they play an important role in the story that explains why we
exist at alle Surely that is enough to make them part of the body of fact that
determines what I can and cannot do! If lexist at least partly because of
these conditions, then how can it be the case that I have the power to act in
ways that are incompatible with them?"
Let's try to put this a bit more precisely. Again, let C be the freedom limiting set of conditions. Then we have the following anti-Molinist argument.
1.

It is not within my power to perform (or refrain from performing) any act that is strictly inconsistent with C .

2.

C includes every fact that contributes (directly or indirectly) to
the explanation of my existence.

3.

The true counterfactuals of freedom contribute (at least indirectly) to the explanation of n1y existence.

4.

Therefore, it is not within my power to perform (or refrain from
performing) any act that is strictly inconsistent with the true
counterfactuals of freedom.

5.

For any concrete situation C, and set of alternatives, A and ,..,A,
either C~A or C~,..,A is among the true counterfactuals of freedom that contribute to the explanation of my existence.
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6.

So whether 1do A or ,...,A, the opposite choice is strictly inconsistent with the true counterfactuals of freedom.

7.

Therefore, whether 1 do A or ,...,A, it is not in my power to do the
opposite.

One merit of this argument is that it makes it clear precisely why
Molinism seems problematic to many philosophers who do not have a
similar problem with arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. God's foreknowledge does not contribute to the explanation of my existence, whereas God's middle knowledge of what we would all do if created does so contribute. It isn't a direct
causal contribution, to be sure. The counterfactuals of freedom are not
causallaws, and God's middle knowledge of them is not causally sufficient
for his decision to create uso Nevertheless, the Molinist holds that God creates us at least partly because of what he knows we would do if created,
and that is what makes premise 3 true.
Another merit of this way of putting the argument is that it completely
sidesteps the controversy about whether or not explanatory priority is a
transitive relation. What matters to the argument is whether the counterfactuals of freedom contribute (however indirectly) to the explanation of
our existence. If they do, then they must belong to the freedom limiting set
of conditions, C, and the game is over.

A way outJor Molinists
Or is it? What about premise 2? Clearly we should include in C all
those conditions that make a causal contribution to the explanation of our
existence. But what about conditions making the sort of contribution
Molinists have in mind when they speak of the role played by middle
knowledge in creation? Is simply being among God's reasons for creating
us sufficient for membership in C ?
This is not an easy question to answer, and equally smart and wellinformed philosophers seem to have incompatible intuitions. On the one
hand, it is hard to believe that anyone has the power - even the "counterfactual" power - to act in ways that are incompatible with any part of the
explanation of one's existence. On the other hand, Molinists are right to
point out that the counterfactuals of freedom are not laws that govem our
behavior, and that on their view nothing causes us to act as we do. Is this
enough to get the Molinist off the hook?
1 believe there is a bit of logical space for the Molinist to occupy.
Whether we think it is big enough depends, 1 think, on our analysis of libertarian freedom. 1 conclude this paper by tracing the outlines of an analysis that would give the Molinist what he wants.
Libertarians typically say two things aboLlt the concept of a free action.
(I)

Nothing (else) caused the agent to act as he did.
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Exactly as things were at the time of action, the agent could
have refrained from doing the act.

Libertarians have often defended (I) by trying to derive it from (11). If
conditions apart from the agent were sufficient to cause him to act as he
does, then the agent could not do otherwise, and (11) is false. But recently,
there has been a move in the direction of seeing (I) as a fundamental principIe standing on its own independently of (11). Indeed, some libertarians
are willing to entertain the possibility that Frankfurt-style counterexamples
refute (11).
It will be recalled that Frankfurt's original counterexample went something like this. Black wants Jones to murder Green. Black is monitoring
the state of Jones's brain and will intervene if Jones shows any sign of not
deciding "on his own" to murder Green. As it happens, Jones mllrders
Green without any intervention from Black. It seems that Jones could not
have done otherwise (had he shown any sign of not doing so, Black would
have intervened). And yet, intuitively, it seems that Jones is responsible
for murdering Green. Precisely because he did it "on his own," we think
he acted freely.
However, as incompatibilists have often pointed out, even if Jones was
unable to avoid murdering Green, the fact remains that he was able to
avoid doing it on his own, and thus to avoid doing it freely. So it seems that
a modified version of principle (11) might still be true of any free action.
(11*) Exactly as things were at the tinle of action, the agent could
have refrained from freely doing the act.
It is not easy to see how to construct a Frankfurt-style counterexample
to (11*). If Black intervenes, he can make Jones do the deed, but he cannot

nlake hirn do it freely. Or so it would seem.
But what if Black had middle knowledge? And what if Jones's counterfactuals of freedom were such that he would freely murder Green in a variety of different situations? Black would then not need to monitor Jones's
brain. Nor would he need to intervene in the crude way that prevents
Jones from doing the act "on his own." No, all Black would have to do is
make sure that Green is never in any of those situations in which Black
knows that Jones will not freely do the deed. Then, since Jones does not
have the power to put hirnself in any other situation, it might seem that he
cannot avoid freely doing the act, contrary to (11*).
Do we now have a counterexample to (II*)? That depends on whether
we think that the truths about what Jones would do in different situations
belong to the freedom limiting set of conditions, C. If they do, then Jones
could not have freely refrained from doing the act and we have a clear
counterexample to (11*). Otherwise, we do not.
5urprisingly enough, I think a Molinist might be able to live with an
affirmative answer to this question. He might argue that neither (11) nor
(11*) is an absolute requirement for freedom and responsibility, while insisting that freedom and responsibility are not compatible with causal determinism. For what is it that makes us think that Jones acts freely if not that
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he acts on his own without interference from Black - or from any other
cause apart from Jones hirnself? It is because condition (I) above is unaffected that we think Jones acts freely and is responsible for hjs act. Or so a
libertarian with Molinist sympathies might say.
Libertarians who believe in agent causation may PLlt the point in the following way. Even though Jones could not have avoided killing Green, he
did tlle murder freely because he agent-caused it, and because nothing (else)
caused hirn to agent-cause it. That is the fundamental requirement for libertarian freedom, a requirement that is - obviously enough - incompatible
with any sort of causal determinism.
If this is right, then the proper response to our anti-Molinist argument is
simply to point out that even if it succeeds in establishing that middle
knowledge is incornpatible with the possibility of doing otherwise, it fails
to establish that no one ever acts freely in a strong libertarian sense. As
long as the cOLmterfactuals in virtue of which it is impossible for us to do
otherwise are not causal laws, and as long as God does not make us act in
accordance with them, they may still be genuine counterfactuals of freedom, and Molinism emerges from the battle unscathed.
Some Molinists may be satisfied with this solution to the problem, but I
suspect that most will not want to give up on the alternative possibilities
requirement. The conclusion of OLlr anti-Molinist argument - "whether I
do A or ,...-A, it is not in my power to do the opposite" - will be unacceptable to them. They will want to insist that there must be some sense - a
strongly incompatibilist sense - in which genuine freedom does require the
"power to do the opposite." They will therefore want to insist that we do
not llave a clear counterexample to (11*), on the ground that the facts about
what a person would do in every possible situation do not belong to the
freedom-lirniting set of conditions, C .
Can we give a clear rationale for this position, however? Can tlle
Molinist do more than claim that the anti-Molinist has yet to prove that the
relevant subjunctive conditionals do belollg to C? I think perhaps he can.
What matters to the freedom with which an act is performed, we have
suggested, is how and by what the act is caused. But this needn't mean that
freedom does not entail alternative possibilities. It's just that if it does
entail alternative possibilities, those possibilities must be defined in relation
to the causal antecedents of the act. This suggestion may be developed as follows.
What does it mean to say that "Jones could have chosen otherwise?"
Not that Jones could have done otherwise, given all the facts about Jones's
antecedents, since that set of conditions includes the truth of the proposition that Jones would not do otherwise. What it does mean is that Jones
could have done otherwise, given all the conditions that (directly or indirectly) causally influence hirn - givell all the conditions that playa causal role
in the explanation of his behavior. Relative to that set of cOllditions, he can
do A or refrain from doing A. For both A and ,...-A are "strictly consistent"
with this narrower set of conditions.
Different senses of "possibility" may thus be defined in terms of different sets of conditions. An act is "possible" in sense Pe if it is strictly consistent with a set of conditions c. Suppose that C includes the fact that I have
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not bothered to learn Finnish. Then it is not possible for me to speak it.
Now suppose that C does not include this fact, but does include my linguistic abilities. Relative to this narrower set of facts, it is possible for me to
speak FiImish. 14
The critical question, then, is this. Which kind of possibility is required
for the kind of freedom presupposed by moral responsibility? And which
facts sh.ould be included in the set of conditions in relation to which it is
defined? Not all the facts. Where Cis all the facts, nothing is PC-possible
other than what actually happens. So how, exactly, should we restrict
membership in C ?
From a Molinist point of view, it might make sense to impose the following restriction. The relevant conditions are those that (directly or indirectly)
playa causal role in the explanation of our behavior. This has exactly the consequences the Molinist wants - viz., that causal determinism is, whereas middIe knowledge is not, incompatible with freedom and responsibility. If causal
determinism were true, only what we actually do would be strictly consistent
with all the facts about our causal antecedents. But since the counterfactuals
of freedom do not playa causal role in the explanation of our actions, and
since God does not cause us to act in accordance with them, they do not
belong to the relevant set of conditions, and do not rule out alternative possibilities - in the sense of "possibility" that matters to human freedom.
If this is right, then we have a clear rationale for rejecting premise (2) of
OLlr anti-Molinist argument. Granted that there is a freedom-restricting set
of conditions, the Molinist can deny that the counterfactuals of freedom are
included in it. Merely contributing (directly or indirectly) to the explanation
of my existence is not sufficient for membership in c. And since the counterfactuals of freedom do not make a causal contribution, they are excluded.
Some Molinists will not be completely satisfied with this proposal, however. They will not want to deny that God's rniddle knowledge plays a
causal role (albeit not a sufficient causaI role) Ü'l the explanation of our
behavior. Suppose, for exarnple, that God's middle knowledge was
involved in Christ's prediction that Peter would del'lY hirn three times.
Could this not have been at least a necessary causal condition of Peter's
subsequent behavior?15 It may not be too hard to tell a story on which it is,
but the Molinist will not want, on that accoLlnt, to say that the rniddle
knowledge behind Christ's prediction belongs to the freedom-limiting set
of conditions, C - since that would have the unwelcome consequence that
Peter was not free to refrain from denying Christ.
So perhaps the Molinist will want to define C even more narrowly, so
that it includes any condition (or set of conditions) that is causally sufficient
for an act, but does not include conditiol'lS that are only causally necessary
for it. That would still give us a strongly libertarian sense of "possibility" one that would not be incompatible with Peter's having the power to
refrain from denying Christ.

Conclusion
Clearly, further refinement of this proposal is needed. But I think we
must at least be on the right track in suggesting that counterfactuals of free-
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dom are not inimical to freedom because they do not play the right sort of

causal role in the explanation of free actions.
Imagine a cousin of Molinism in which there is a complete set of true
counterfactuals of freedom, but in which they play no role whatever in the
explanation of our existence, our choices, or our actions. (Perhaps because
God does not exist, or because he decides what to create on some altogether different basis.) Would the bare truth of a cOll1plete set of such conditionals have any tendency to show that we are not free to choose and act in
ways that are "strictly inconsistent" with them?
I doubt it. After all, most of us believe that there is a complete body of
truths about tl1e fLlture; but very few regard this as a reason for thinking
that there is only one possible future. Most philosophers think we can
avoid fatalism without the desperate expedient of postulating trLlth value
gaps or denying the law of excluded middle. The consensus position is
that the bare truth of propositions about the fLlture is perfectly compatible
with alternative possibilities.
Why should it be different for the counterfactuals of freedom? Why
should their bare truth be any ll10re inimical to freedom than is the
antecedent truth of non-conditional predictions about what we will do?
As far as I can see, it isn't.
Now back to Molinism proper. Why should the mere fact that God
knows the true counterfactuals of freedom, and takes them into account in
deciding what to do make any difference? As long as God does not make
us act in accordance with his middle knowledge, it is very difficult to see
how his decision process can interfere with our freedom of choice. If this is
really all there is to the explanatory priority of the counterfactuals of freedom,
then it is h.ard to see how it can be the difference that makes a difference.
When I began working on this topic, I expected to develop a successful
Adams-style argument against Molinism. But as often happens when one
thinks hard about a philosophical problem for a long time, I have had to
cl1ange my ll1ind. Unless Adams (or someone) can provide a convincing
reason for including the counterfactuals of freedom in the set of conditions
relative to which alternate possibilities are defined, our anti-Molinist argument must be deemed a failure. Explanatory priority will not do the trick. 16
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NOTES
1. Since many of these conditionals have contrary to fact antecedents.
2. Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
3. William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), pp. 39-52.
4. Robert Adams, "An Anti-Molinist Argument," in James E. Tomberlin,
ed, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5 (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1991), pp.
343-353.
5. Adams, p. 349.
6. Adams, p. 350. Note that '(SI)' is my label. In the Adams text, this prin-
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ciple is step (12) of the argument.
7. Flint, p. 163.
8. In fairness to Flint, it should be noted that he is not himself especially
enthusiastic about calling this explanatory priority, and only reluctantly uses
Adams' terminology.
9. Flint, p. 165.
10. Flint, p. 163.
11. Flint, p. 163.
12. Flint, p. 163.
13. I do not propose this as an adequate analysis of the concept of explanation. I offer it merely as a partial description of the sort of thing that is typically
involved in explanation - adescription sufficient to pick out the notion of
"explanation" that is involved in what Adams calls "explanatory priority."
14. The reader will notice that I have borrowed this example from David
Lewis, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel," American Philosophical Quarterly 13
(1976), pp. 145-52.
15. I owe this example to Thomas Flint.
16. I wish to express my thanks to the editor and the referees of Faith and
Philosophy for their very helpful comments and suggestions. I am especially
grateful to Thomas Flint for straightening me out about several things.

